Das Eröffnungsstatement der CMC

Statement by the Cluster Munition Coalition Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions 5 December 2007

Thank you Mr. Chairperson and congratulations to Austria for hosting this meeting. We would echo others in recognising the remarkable progress and momentum that this conference represents. We are pleased to see such wide participation including from the majority of past or present producers and a number of past users as well as almost all the affected states.

We support the comprehensive approach of the Vienna discussion text, which combines a prohibition on a weapon category with positive obligations on – and deadlines for the completion of – stockpile destruction and clearance, as well as obligations for victim assistance and international assistance more broadly. This approach has produced admirable results for antipersonnel mines and can be duplicated for cluster munitions. The real and positive effects and the relevance of this treaty are beyond question.

The comprehensive approach outlined in the draft discussion text meets many of the CMC’s basic requirements for a treaty as set out in the CMC Key Principles document previously circulated. The Vienna text includes some important improvements from the text circulated prior to the Lima meeting in May. I would like to highlight some key points from the CMC observations on the Vienna text, which is available today.

Regarding general obligations and scope we support the clearer and more streamlined language in Article 1 compared to the Lima text.  As we noted in our appeal yesterday we encourage states to strive for the clearest and most precise provisions throughout the draft text.

We consider that the definition in this text is a considerable improvement over the Lima text.  It adopts the correct approach in beginning with a general prohibition and then calling for an explicit delineation of any potential weapons that do not fall under the definition.

There are a number of areas that we believe will make the difference between an effective treaty and a treaty that will fall short and will not live up to the expectations of those affected by or at risk from cluster munitions. A treaty that falls short on these key areas will not command the support of the CMC.

Firstly the CMC cannot support a treaty that contains an exception for submunitions with self-destruct, self-deactivation or self-neutralizing features, for submunitions with a certain reliability (or failure) rate, or for so-called “direct fire” submunitions.  We do not believe that those approaches will achieve the goal of an international convention banning all cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. 

The CMC cannot support a treaty that contains an exception for cluster munitions based solely on factors such as “sensor-fuzed” submunitions or a specific number of submunitions. 

As we have consistently said, the burden of proof must be on States to demonstrate that any proposed exceptions to the prohibition on cluster munitions will not cause unacceptable harm to civilians, that they will not have the objectionable effects of cluster munitions: that they will not have an indiscriminate wide area effect, and will not leave behind large numbers of duds.

In addition the CMC could not support a treaty that allowed a transition period that permits ongoing use of the banned weapon.

We believe storage and stockpile destruction are crucial in order to prevent future proliferation of these weapons. We believe there should be a detailed technical assessment of why the proposed period of six years is necessary to destroy stockpiles of cluster munitions, as opposed to a shorter time frame.

We do not support the provision allowing for an extension of the stockpile destruction deadline for a period of up to ten years, and the related provision allowing for that ten-year extension to be renewed.

We note that, unlike the Mine Ban Treaty, there is no provision allowing for an exception to retain the prohibited weapon for the purposes of training and development of detection, clearance, and destruction techniques or for the development of counter measures.  We agree that an exception is unnecessary, as there is no demonstrated requirement for live submunitions for such purposes.  We are also concerned that such an exception could be easily abused.

Regarding clearance of unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions we support the revised time frame for clearance of five years, as most of the affected countries in the world today could complete clearance programs within five years given adequate political will, prioritization, and international support. We understand that there could be an extension period but only a very few countries should need this.

The CMC supports having a separate article for victim assistance and the mention of the main elements of victim assistance from the Nairobi Action Plan of the Mine Ban Treaty. We believe this area of the text is the most well developed but we also believe it can still be improved based on the needs of survivors and the views of practitioners.

We find the language international cooperation and assistance a significant improvement over the Lima draft and we especially support the language in 6.4 that “in particular a State Party that has used cluster munitions” shall provide assistance for clearance.  Similar language should be used in 6.6 and 6.8 regarding the measures to protect civilians and to provide victim assistance.

We have a number of other comments that we will offer over the course of the week and the CMC commentary on the Vienna text is available at the back of the room. We hope states will also be providing detailed examination of the text and clear explanations of their policy positions on key issues and to do so with an evidence-based approach. Finally we would encourage states that have not already done so to express their support this week for the Oslo Declaration and the Oslo Process.

Thank you Mr. Chairperson

_{Stand: 12/2007}